Abstract: A team of specialists on China's energy sector reviews a series of major transitions that have transformed that country's oil economy over the past two decades. These include, on the demand side, (a) the increasing role of oil in the economy as a whole vis-à-vis other major energy carriers (as incomes have risen and millions of households have purchased vehicles and have also traveled by air), and (b) an increasing emphasis on energy efficiency and carbon mitigation. On the supply side, several additional transitions are discussed, namely
INTRODUCTION

U
ntil other types of transport fuels and vehicles become commercially viable, oil will remain indispensable to all types of road transport, as well as to air and water transport and the military sector. Oil is also the key ingredient used in the manufacture of the plastic substances found in all consumer goods, including footwear, kitchenware, toys, furniture, audio and communications equipment, sports equipment, vehicles, etc. Thus, of all the commodities that China imports, oil is certainly the one that the government is most concerned about securing.
China became a net importer of oil products in 1993, and a net importer of crude oil in 1996. Since then, oil imports have risen sharply. The country must now import some 55 percent of its oil requirements and, as predicted by the International Energy Agency (IEA, 2011b, p. 11) , will need to bring in 79 percent of the oil it consumes by 2030.
China has no option but to import oil because domestic production cannot meet its demand. In the years since becoming a net oil importer, the country has continued to experience strong economic growth. In 2011, it officially became the world's second-largest economy, and even during the global financial crisis and its immediate aftermath managed to achieve 8.7 percent (2009) and 10.3 percent GDP growth (2010) . In 2009, when world oil demand fell 1.24 million barrels per day (mb/d), China's demand increased by 0.7 mb/d (IEA, 2011c).
The government issued oil import bans in 1994 and 1998, partly in order to free itself from foreign oil and partly to protect China's inefficient petroleum industry from foreign competition (Downs, 2004) . From 1993 to 2000, the anxiety over Chinese dependence on foreign oil was gradually replaced by fear about whether China could finance all of the oil it needed (Downs, 2006) . The country had been a major oil exporter, with oil a key source of hard currency, but beginning in the mid-1990s imports would represent an ever-increasing outflow of hard currency. However, with robust economic growth fear has given way to concerns about whether there is enough oil available for China to purchase from abroad.
This paper examines some of the demand-side and supply-side transitions that have occurred in China's oil economy over the period 1990-2010. 2 These can be viewed, respectively, as demand-side and supply-side approaches to the nation's energy security. In order to maintain the country's development, modernization, and emerging super-power status, the government has had to respond quickly to changing domestic and global oil market conditions. Having become such a large oil importer, China's national oil companies (NOCs) have had to integrate into the world oil market. Indeed, China is rapidly becoming the most important player therein, and how the country's global stature will be assessed over the next 20 years could be determined in large measure by how it behaves in the international oil market.
PHENOMENAL ECONOMIC GROWTH, 1990-2010
The most significant of the economic reforms (gaige kaifang) launched in 1978 were the opening of China to foreign investment for the first time since the Kuomintang era and the creation of special economic zones (SEZs)-designated geographic areas with liberal policies and tax incentives to attract foreign investors. China's economic growth since the early 1980s has been rapid and significant, averaging 9.9 percent in terms of real GDP (National Bureau of Statistics, 2010) . Home to 1.34 billion inhabitants, China last year replaced Japan as the world's second-largest economy after the United States.
The country's ascent is largely attributed to the massive amount of trade it conducts not only with the United States, but also the rest of the world, and to investment capital inflows. China's foreign exchange (forex) reserves were minimal at the start of the reform era at US$ 1.6 billion, 3 but enough to cover the requirements of a country with a quite small import bill (Chinability, 2011; Keidel, 2011) . In 1990, the country's forex reserves reached US $29.6 billion. The 1990s saw rapid accumulation of forex, owing much to both merchandise and services trade-producing a current account surplus and a comfortable net capital inflow. Following China's entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001, imports and exports both increased exponentially, but perhaps most striking was China's new economic profile, which allowed it to become the largest foreign direct investment (FDI) recipient in the world in 2004, with inflows of US$53.5 billion (UNCTAD, 2004, p. 80) . In October 2006, China's forex reserves exceeded US$ 1 billion and continued upward to US$ 3 billion as of March 2011 (Chinability, 2011) .
Though extremely successful, China remains a developing country, ranking 89th of 169 countries according to its Its Human Development Index value (0.663; UNDP, 2010, pp. 143-146) . 4 It is worth noting, however, that the country is but four notches (ranking positions)
away from being upgraded to the "High Human Development" range from the "Medium" range, where it currently stands. China's insatiable appetite for energy has made it the largest energy user in the world (Xinhua News Agency, 2011), with consumption greater than that of the other three BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India) combined. It is widely known as the "factory of the world," now exporting in a single day more than it exported in all of 1978 (Zakaria, 2008, p.89) . As the majority of the items that China produces and exports around the world contain plastics made from petrochemicals, the remarkable success of the hundreds of thousands of manufacturing outlets across the country has hinged on abundant and reliable supplies of oil.
DEMAND-SIDE TRANSITIONS
Changes in the Role and Use of Oil in the Economy
In terms of total energy consumption, oil accounted for 16.6 percent in 1990, peaked at 22.3 percent in 2002, and has gradually declined thereafter to 16.5 in 2010 (see Table 1 ). Coal has always been the main form of energy in China, largely due to its vast reserves (thirdlargest in the world) that are available in varying quality all over the country, although the best are located in the northern Central provinces of Shanxi, Shaanxi, and Inner Mongolia. Until the 1980s, coal was used in power generation, industry, and transport, but today it is almost exclusively used for power generation (accounting for 76.8 percent of total electricity generated in 2010) and in some heavy industries (IEA, 2011a; China Electricity Council, 2011) . The country also has extensive hydropower resources, accounting for 16.3 percent of electricity generation in 2010; in the same year natural gas accounted for 1.7, nuclear power for 1.8, and wind and other renewable sources for 1.2 percent. Oil accounted for only 2.2 percent of electricity generation, much less than it did in earlier years (China Electricity Council, 2011) .
In 1990, almost two-thirds of all oil used was attributed to the industrial sector (see Table  2 ). The top oil-consuming industries in 2009 were petrochemicals, chemicals, oil and natural gas extraction, non-metallic mineral production, and construction. Together, they accounted for almost 80 percent of total industrial oil use (Department, 2011) . The construction and non-metallic minerals sectors emerged as major oil consumers following the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-1998. The latter is no surprise given China's grip on global rare earth minerals production (97 percent of global output) despite having only 37 percent of the world's total rare earth reserves (USGS, 2010) . The next largest oil-consuming sectors in 1990 after industry were the transportation (14.7 percent), 5 and agricultural (9.0) 6 sectors. Nearly 20 years later, in 2009, industry's share had dropped to 36.9 percent and agriculture's to 3.7 percent, while that of the transportation sector more than doubled to 35.6 percent. Three major reasons account for the rapid growth in the transport sector's demand for oil. First, total private vehicle ownership in China skyrocketed from 816,200 units in 1990 to 45,749,100 units in 2009 . Ownership of private passenger vehicles alone grew at an average rate of nearly 31 percent (National Bureau, n.d.-b) . Studies suggest that when a country's per capita GDP surpasses US $1000, vehicle ownership takes off (Skeer and Wang, existence of disparities and deprivation. Components include life expectancy at birth, mean years of schooling, expected years of schooling, and gross national income (GNI) per capita.
5 "Transport" here refers to the broader category of "Transport, Storage, and Postal" (see Table 2 ). 6 "Agriculture" here refers to the broader category of "Agriculture, Forestry, Animal Husbandry, Fisheries, and Water Conservation Activities) (see Table 2 ).
2007
). The increase in Chinese personal incomes has made vehicles increasingly affordable and desirable.
7 Moreover, China's entry into the World Trade Organization has triggered a price war among domestic automobile manufacturers, 8 making vehicles even more affordable (Gallagher, 2006) . In 2009, Guangdong, Shandong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Hebei, and Beijing all had more than 3.5 million vehicles on their roads, and in 2010, China surpassed the United States to become the largest market for automobiles (Lewis, 2010) . As per capita car ownership is still low domestically, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC, 2010, p.87) projects that passenger car ownership in China will grow at 9 percent annually from 2007 to 2030 compared to a rate of only 2.5 percent for the world as a whole. The dieselization of rail transport and development of domestic air transport has also contributed to the increase in the transportation sector's share in total energy demand, from 76.6 percent in 1996 to 89.1 percent in 2009. The Chinese government's 1994 Auto Policy designated the automobile industry as a pillar of economic development and officially encouraged private ownership of vehicles (Leung, 2010) .
8 Domestic products accounted for more than 95 percent of vehicle sales in China (Gallagher, 2006) . 9 It should be noted, however, that according to international practice and Chinese official statistics, oil demand by international air transport is not counted as being used domestically, but classified separately as "bunker." In terms of oil consumption by usage, it has always been dominated by end-use consumption, rising from 81.0 percent of the total in 1990 to 92.7 percent in 2009 (Table 3) . Of this total, industrial end-use consumption dropped markedly from 45.1 to 34.1 percent over the same period. Intermediate consumption fell from 14.2 to 6.2 percent, most dramatically in power generation use, which slid from 10.7 to only 1.6 percent ( Table 3 ). As noted above, the country is relying primarily on coal to generate power, as very little oil is used for this purpose at present (Leung, 2010) .
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Greater Emphasis on Energy Efficiency and Carbon Mitigation
Since 2008, China's emissions of carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) have been the largest in the world. They now stand at nearly 25 percent of the global total and the International Energy Agency has suggested that China's CO 2 emissions must peak by 2020 if the world is to meet its 2050 target of achieving a 50 percent reduction in greenhouse gases (Reuters, 2010) . Global 10 Of the oil consumed in power generation, much is used to power diesel generators. concern about climate change has prompted the Chinese government to take serious measures to reduce the CO 2 emissions resulting from the burning of fossil fuels. Among these are a climate change target that aims to reduce CO 2 intensity per unit of GDP by 40-45 percent from the 2005 level by 2020, through energy conservation, efficiency and intensity targets, as well as transport policies (Central Government Portal, 2009 ).
Measures to slow demand growth tend to be politically more difficult to implement than measures to expand supply (e.g., see Downs, 2006 ). Yet, demand-side measures hold an important place in China's energy policy, as evidenced in its five-year plans (FYPs), which signal the critical role energy plays not only in economic development, but also in social development and the environmental health of the growing nation (Shiu and Lam, 2004; Yuan and Zuo, 2011) .
The Eleventh Five Year Plan (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) set an ambitious target for energy-efficiency improvement through reduction of the country's energy intensity in terms of GDP by 20 percent over a period of 5 years. The Twelfth FYP (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) outlines energy and climate change targets, including a 16 percent reduction of energy intensity and a 17 percent reduction in CO 2 emissions per unit of GDP by 2015 (Seligsohn and Hsu, 2011) . It outlines China's recognition of the need to conserve resources and protect the environment by calling for the proportion of non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption to increase to 11.4 percent (from the current 7.8 percent). The release of major pollutants is to be reduced by 8-10 percent (NDRC, 2011, p. 13).
The energy policy reforms announced since the country became a net oil importer signal a major shift in China's strategic thinking about its long-term economic and energy development (Downs, 2006; Lin et al., 2008; Price et al., 2011) . For example, the 20 percent energyintensity target translates into an annual reduction of 1.5 billion tons of CO 2 by 2010.
Fundamental to reaching the energy intensity and CO 2 reduction targets is improving the energy efficiency of vehicles and the introduction of non-fossil fueled cars. The average fuel economy of family vehicles in China is already higher than that in the United States, mainly because cars in China tend to be smaller. In 2009, the average new car in China could travel 35.8 miles per gallon of gasoline, but the new plan released in 2009 demanded that car makers achieve 42.2 miles to the gallon by 2015. The plan is significant, considering that President Barack Obama is hoping that car manufacturers in the United States will achieve an average of 35.5 miles per gallon by 2016 (Bradsher, 2009 ). In addition, China currently provides a subsidy of 3,000 yuan (US $455) for each consumer who buys a vehicle with an engine of 1.6 liters or smaller. In late 2010, the Ministry of Finance promised extended subsidies for energy-efficient cars and new energy-saving cars throughout 2011. The government is also providing subsidies for new energy cars in a small number of cities under a trial program (Dow Jones, 2010). Moreover, after 14 years of debate, the government finally launched a fuel tax reform in 2009 (Kong, 2009) . Many believe that the reform will encourage residents to buy smaller and more efficient cars.
Chinese leaders recognize that China's burgeoning vehicle fleet complicates their efforts to reduce oil demand growth and carbon emissions. In order to reconcile the conflicting objectives of moderating oil demand growth and developing China's automobile industry, a number of measures have been introduced that aim to restrain road transport consumption by encouraging the use of more fuel-efficient vehicles rather than limiting the number of vehicles (Downs, 2006, p. 30) . The introduction of fuel economy standards (July 2005) , and a luxury car tax (April 2006) are helping to manage oil demand growth in the transport sector.
Another means of encouraging efficient use of oil is through the pricing mechanism. Starting in 1998, crude oil in the Chinese domestic market has been priced at levels referenced to international market prices. Chinese crude oil producers, as with most non-OPEC producers, use formulas that link the price of the crude oil they sell to the average price of benchmark crude oils of similar quality in the world market.
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The government still caps the domestic prices of certain refined oil products, including diesel and gasoline. In recent years, however, it has relaxed the price controls on these products. Controlling the prices of oil products was meant to protect those oil consumers who are highly sensitive to price variations (e.g., farmers and taxi drivers) from the volatility of oil prices, as well as to curb inflation and to mitigate social instability. However, because China now depends heavily on oil imports, the government has found rigid price controls to be unsustainable. It also has become increasingly aware that oil products are not being consumed as efficiently as they might. It therefore launched a new policy on January 1, 2009 that established an explicit link between domestic oil product prices and international crude oil prices, with an adjustment to domestic product prices if international crude oil prices fluctuate by more than 4 percent for 22 consecutive working days (IEA, 2010) . Hence, the 2009 policy marked a new stage in the internationalization of domestic oil prices.
SUPPLY-SIDE TRANSITIONS New Oil Fields Replacing Old Ones
A significant change that has taken place in China's oil production has been the geographical shift in oil production from northeastern China to the central and western areasthe Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, Sichuan, Gansu, and Inner Mongolia-as well as offshore in the Bohai Bay and South China Sea (Fig. 1) . Northeast China's share of total oil production dropped from nearly 80 percent in 1990 to only 47 percent in 2009. Over the same period, central and west China's share nearly doubled, from 19 percent to 36 percent, while that from offshore fields rose steadily from only 1 to nearly 17 percent (Table 4) .
Prior to the discovery in the 1960s of the Daqing, Shengli, and Liaohe oil fields, in the provinces of Heilongjiang, Shandong, and Liaoning, respectively, China was considered almost oil-barren. However, the spectacular size of these fields turned the country into a net exporter of crude oil through the 1980s and early 1990s, 12 until domestic demand for oil increased to the point where China became a net importer in 1996. In 2006, it became the world's third-largest net importer of oil According to the 1998 pricing reform, Chinese crude oil is divided into four types: Light (Turpan-Hami oil), Medium I (Daqing, Tarim, Zhongyuan, Linpan, North China, and Jidong oils), Medium II (Shengli and Dagang oils) and Heavy (Gudao oil). The price of Light crude oil is linked to that of Tapis, which is a Malaysian crude used as a pricing benchmark in Singapore and Australia. The price of Medium I is linked to that of Minas crude, of Medium II to Cinta crude, and of Heavy to Duri crude oil. The final price is obtained by including a premium or discount to the (after-tax) reference price.
12 Exports peaked in 1985 at 35 million tons (Shichor, 1998) . 13 It subsequently overtook Japan in 2010 to become the world's second-largest importer of oil (see below).
of the total output in eastern China, but have been heavily tapped for several decades so that production is becoming increasingly difficult and costly. Shengli's output peaked at 33.6 million tons (mt) in 1991, Liaohe's at 15.5 mt in 1995, and Daqing's at 56 mt in 1997. Production at each began to decline afterward (Lawrence Berkeley, 2008) . Consequently, recent exploration activity has focused on the western and central areas and offshore. Since the 1990s, China has adopted a strategy to "stabilize the east, explore the west, and develop offshore" (wenzhu dongbu, kaifa xibu, fazhan haishang) (Zhu, 2010) . Analysts generally tend to believe that increased output from fields in western China and offshore will only slightly offset the production declines in the oldest and largest fields in the northeast.
From Major Oil Exporter to Second-Largest Importer
From 1990 to 2010, oil production rose from 138.3 mt to 204.7 mt but Chinese oil consumption soared from 114.4 mt to 458.1 Mt (Fig. 2) The average annual increases in both production and consumption of crude oil as a percentage of total energy over the last two decades are presented in Table 5 . While the growth rate of domestic production of crude oil dipped from 1996 to 2000, consumption grew at 8.15 percent, peaking in the 2001-2005 period.
As it became more dependent on imported oil, China came under increasing pressure to secure reliable supplies. In 2001, the country devised the zou chuqu (go out, go global) policy, instructing and motivating state-owned and private Chinese enterprises and banks to become closely involved in natural resource procurement and infrastructure development abroad to secure resources that China could not supply itself (Mol, 2010, p. 10) . In short, the Chinese government no longer abhors the idea of importing oil, 14 as it can use its enormous foreign exchange reserves (steadily amassed since the 1980s) to help leverage loans for oil deals, such as those negotiated in recent years with Russia, Brazil, Venezuela, Kazakhstan, Ecuador, and Turkmenistan. Table 6 indicates that in 1989 China procured all of its oil imports from only five countries, but by 2009 it was obtaining 80 percent of its imports from 10 different ones. In 1990, 14 China also continues to export oil, but the amount exported declined from 24.4 Mt in 1989 to 5.2 Mt in 2009 (Tien, 1994 (Tien, , 2010 the Middle East and Asia Pacific regions supplied all of China's crude oil imports (see Table  7 ). that Chinese refiners appear to favor. 15 However, the importance of the Middle Eastern crudes to China is unlikely to decline in the foreseeable future, because the region holds some 57 percent of the global proven reserves of oil (BP, 2010) .
Expanding and Diversifying Oil Import Sources
Thirty years after the establishment of special economic zones (SEZs) in China, the SEZ growth model has been transplanted to Africa in a trail-blazing attempt by Chinese firms to acquire mineral and energy assets across the African continent (Davies, 2007 ; see also Pannell, 2008) . In recent years, the Chinese have been purchasing equity shares in established oil fields instead of buying the rights for future exploration and development. This approach is said to be a reflection of a strategic judgment that greater security can be achieved through vertical integration, thereby providing oil to Chinese consumers below the international market price (Downs, 2004; Alden, 2005) .
Alden (2005) argued that Sino-African relations are largely shaped by four factors of strategic importance, reflecting China's drive for: (1) resource security; (2) new markets and investment opportunities; (3) symbolic diplomacy; and (4) development cooperation and forging strategic partnerships. Of the four, perhaps most important is China's ever-increasing need for energy. Soon after becoming a net oil importer, the Chinese government purchased several oil refineries in Algeria. In 1996, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), the country's largest oil and gas producer and supplier and a subsidiary of PetroChina, purchased the largest share (40 percent) of the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC).
The Forum on China-African Cooperation (FOCAC), established in 2000, has institutionalized the symbolic diplomacy between China and Africa (South-South partnership). China is Africa's third-largest trading partner behind the United States and France, and this partnership has renewed Africa's geo-economic position in the global setting. The country's trade with 15 It should be noted that the light sweet crudes from West Africa are similar to that from Daqing, making them also quite suitable for Chinese refineries (Downs, 2006 Tien, 1994 Tien, , 1996 Tien, , 2000 Tien, , 2005 Tien, , 2010 Africa now represents 10.4 percent of the continent's total trade, and is currently more than 10 times higher than in 2000, increasing from $11 billion to $129 billion (Gedye, 2011) . It should be noted that acquisition of oil reserves abroad cannot guarantee China a supply of oil that is more reliable and less expensive than buying the commodity in the international markets. First, equity oil cannot protect Chinese consumers from a price shock. Second, if oil produced overseas by Chinese NOCs is shipped home, it is likely to encounter the same transportation risks as oil purchased by a Chinese company on the spot market. Third, much of China's equity oil produced is not shipped home. This is because Chinese NOCs often sell their foreign equity oil in the international markets when the domestic market prices are lower. It is also because the transport cost of China's equity oil produced in a distant part of the world, such as West Africa, is too high when the country can simply import oil from a closer region, such as the Middle East. For example, CNPC has historically transported most of its Sudanese equity oil to China, but in 2006 sold most of its production from Sudan in the international markets, probably because the price was higher. Fourth, even if a larger proportion of China's foreign equity oil is shipped back home, import dependency on oil will increase anyway (Leung, 2011) . Sources: Compiled by authors from Tien, 1994 Tien, , 1996 Tien, , 2000 Tien, , 2005 Tien, , 2010 .
Internationalization of National Oil Companies
In view of China's slowing domestic oil production, Chinese NOCs turned to acquiring foreign oil assets in the early 1990s. In 1992, the CNPC invested in the Canadian oil sands industry, marking the very first overseas acquisition by a Chinese NOC (ibid.). After being listed on the Hong Kong and New York stock exchanges in the early 2000s, the NOCs progressively became more active in the world oil market. This appears to reflect a realization among their directors that, in order to become internationally integrated energy corporations, the NOCs needed to improve their technical and managerial know-how by actively participating in the global energy market. Throughout the past decade, the three major NOCs, namely, CNPC, Sinopec, and the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), along with others such as Sinochem, have expanded their upstream investment activities abroad. The total amount spent on mergers and acquisitions reached US $18.2 billion in 2009, accounting for 13 percent of the total global acquisitions and 61 percent of all acquisitions by NOCs in that year. By the first quarter of 2010, Chinese oil companies were operating in the upstream oil sector of 31 countries and had equity production in 20 countries (IEA, 2011c, p. 17) .
More Oil Imports Brought in by Land
At present, most of the oil China imports arrives in tankers. In addition to the need to continuously increase oil imports over the foreseeable future, a key reason for the recent completion of two pipelines from neighboring countries was to obviate the risk confronting tankers when passing through two chokepoints. More specifically, oil coming from the Middle East must first pass through the Straits of Hormuz, which separate the Persian Gulf from the Gulf of Oman and Arabian Sea. 16 Clearly, submarines or mines could be deployed to block all tanker traffic (Thomson and Horii, 2009, p. 648) . Middle Eastern oil, as well as oil from Africa and other parts of the world (70 to 80 percent of all the oil coming to China) must also pass through the narrow (less than 3 km at its narrowest point) and extremely busy Malacca and Singapore Straits. It is feared that oil shipments here could similarly be disrupted, in this case by pirate attacks or blockades by the U.S. Navy in response to a conflict over Taiwan (Leung, 2011) .
As of June 2011, China had two operational transnational oil pipelines (the KazakhstanChina pipeline and the Russia-China pipeline), one under construction (Myanmar-China), and the other under consideration (Pakistan-China). Pipeline politics are complicated, and often driven by divergent interests including the desire of individual actors to play a role in shaping policy, the parochial interests of local governments, rivalry among Chinese NOCs, concerns over oil security, and, of course, geopolitics (Kong, 2010b) .
For example, despite the great interest of both Russian and Chinese NOCs in building the Russia-China pipeline, negotiations were dogged by mistrust (e.g., see Rybalchenko and Komysheva, 2005) . A long-term oil supply deal worth US $25 billion was finally signed in 2009. Through this agreement, CNPC not only secured 300 thousand barrels per day of Russian oil for 20 years, but also gained the right to participate in the development of East Siberian oil fields. Northeast China's Daqing refinery complex is linked to the East SiberiaPacific Oil (ESPO) pipeline by a 1,030 km branch that begins at Skovorodino (IEA, 2011c, pp. 29-31) .
From the west, the 2,200 km Kazakhstan-China Oil Pipeline extends from Kazakhstan's portion of the Caspian Basin to the Chinese border at Alashankou in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. In Alashankou the pipeline is linked with the west-east AlashankouDushanzi Crude Oil Pipeline, which is 246 km long and supplies the Dushanzi refinery. The line is expected to account for 6 percent of China's total crude imports by 2015. The NOCsnamely CNPC and Kazakhstan's state oil and gas company Kazmunaigas-played pivotal roles in the long negotiations that began in 1997 and in the three-stage construction phase before it went into operation in 2009 (ibid., p. 31).
In the south, the CNPC and Myanmar's Ministry of Energy signed a memorandum of understanding in June 2009 to construct, operate, and manage parallel Sino-Myanmar oil and gas pipelines. The oil pipeline will have a capacity of 440 thousand barrels per day (Kong, 2010b) .
Pipelines have undoubtedly changed the energy cooperation landscape for Central Asia and the pattern of global energy supply from this region (IEA, 2011c). Energy diplomacy, in tandem with the "going-out" policy of Chinese NOCs, as well as the projection of China's soft power have helped spearhead and strengthen energy cooperation with various countries.
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China's energy diplomacy is often able to produce some desirable outcomes in the form of increased imports from oil-producing nations, memorandums of understanding on energy cooperation, purchases of overseas oilfields, and other energy deals between domestic and foreign NOCs (Kong, 2010a) .
Construction of Strategic Petroleum Reserves
In order to enhance the country's energy security, another major change in China's oil economy has occurred in the form of efforts to construct strategic petroleum reserves (SPRs) (Thomson and Horii, 2009 ). The purpose of such reserves is to protect economic growth from a supply or price shock. They are meant to serve as a buffer and help maintain domestic price stability. The International Energy Agency persuaded China to start stockpiling oil when the United States and United Kingdom were preparing to invade Iraq at the start of the Gulf war in 1990. The fear was that a disruption in Middle Eastern exports might cause China to panic and precipitate severe turbulence in international oil markets. In 1999, the Chinese government selected four sites for SPRs: Huangdao in Shandong, Aoshan Island in Zhejiang, Maoming in Guangdong, and Dalian in Liaoning (Thomson, 2005 citing Ogutcu, 2003 .
The imperatives for building SPRs are clear-aging oil fields, uncertain oil prices, and the militarization of energy trade routes. Yet, as Thomson (2005) has noted, China nonetheless enjoys a considerably more secure energy position than many other countries, due to its relatively low dependency on oil for power generation (compared to coal, of which China has huge reserves).
More Domestic Refining
Crude oil itself is of little to no use, and must be processed into a wide variety of oil products. Consequently, in tandem with efforts to secure sufficient supplies of crude, China has been actively developing and upgrading its refining capacity so that it is capable of processing 17 In April 2010, the National Energy Commission (NEC), a State Council-level energy group formed in early 2010, provided most recent expression of the "going-out" policy by declaring the goal of "securing energy supply through international co operation" (IEA, 2011c, p. 12) . a wider range of crude oils, especially those of lower quality, which are sour (high sulfur content) and/or viscous. Until recently, Chinese refineries lacked the capacity to process these low-quality crudes because they were originally designed to handle domestic, lowsulfur crude oils. For many years, China depended heavily on Korean, Taiwanese, Japanese, and Singaporean refineries to process imported crude. Yet very quickly, the sector has now attained the capacity to process lower quality crudes (not only heavy and sour, but sometimes acidic). In so doing, China has enhanced its import flexibility, reduced oil acquisition costs (low-quality crude is cheaper), and enhanced its energy security (Leung, 2009) .
CONCLUDING NOTES
Over the past two decades, China's spectacular economic growth has required staggering amounts of energy. As there is no economically feasible substitute for oil in the transport sector at this time, nor a comparable substitute for oil in the petrochemical or chemical industries, it is a highly desirable strategic commodity.
Over the 20-year interval examined here, the share of oil in the country's total energy consumption did not change a great deal, averaging around 20 percent, but there were, however, dramatic changes in how the oil was used. In 1990, the industrial sector consumed 64 percent of the oil, but by 2009, it consumed only 37 percent. The main cause was the tremendous surge in automobile ownership.
While the demand for oil has been steadily increasing, the government, largely for reasons related to climate change mitigation, has been trying to increase energy consumption efficiency. Several targets have been set to this end, vehicles are being designed to be as fuel efficient as possible, and the authorities have been working toward raising the prices of gasoline and diesel fuel to international levels in order to reduce waste and encourage conservation.
On the supply side, domestic production has been shifting westward and offshore as the aging northeastern fields have long past reached peak levels of production. With domestic consumption of oil (including the consumption of oil-derived substances by the hundreds of thousands of manufacturing companies that have made China the "factory of the world") greatly surpassing domestic production, the country has transitioned from being a major exporter to the world's second-largest importer. The national oil companies have had no choice but to internationalize and become major players in global exploration, production, transportation, and trade. Over the 20-year period under study, the number of countries that China has imported from has greatly expanded and diversified in a macro-regional sense.
China's oil companies have been scouring the globe to purchase oil. Until recently, most of China's oil imports have been delivered by tanker, but two pipelines from neighboring countries (Russia and Kazakhstan) have been completed and more (Myanmar) are planned. Besides needing to bring in oil from anywhere wherever possible, another reason for building more pipelines is the concern about the vulnerability of two "chokepoints"-the Straits of Hormuz and the Malacca Strait-which could be blocked by various means. China's imports (as well as those of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines) from the Middle East, Africa, and elsewhere could be seriously disrupted.
China's rapid economic growth is expected to continue for some time. Thus the demand for oil is likewise expected to continue to increase. The world is making real progress in developing electric vehicles and vehicles that run on biofuels. Perhaps there will be a generation or two of hybrid vehicles before oil is completely replaced by something else in the transport sector. As for oil that is used to produce plastic materials, there are similarly numerous blends and new substances in experimental stages. However, new material that could economically and effectively substitute for oil-derived plastics is not yet available and may take considerable time to develop.
Without doubt China's oil economy will continue to undergo transitions over the next 20 years. Oil may play a smaller role in China in 2030, but will continue to play an important one.
